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Don’t Rush to Abandon a Suspicion-Based Standard
for Searches of Public School Students
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1

I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the Supreme Court has adhered to two basic principles in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “First, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and well-recognized exceptions.”2 Second, highly intrusive
searches, conducted under the warrant requirement or one of its exceptions, are reasonable “only on a showing of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that evidence of the crime
will be found in the place to be searched.”3
However, prior to 1985, public school teachers and administrators were not subject to these Fourth Amendment requirements. According to the doctrine of in loco parentis, teachers and administrators acted under the authority of the parent, not of the state.4 As

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (allowing a
search on less than probable cause where a reasonable suspicion exists that the search will find
evidence of a crime); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (allowing a search even absent a
warrant or probable cause if a reasonable belief exists that the individual is armed and dangerous); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that searches conducted in the
absence of a warrant or probable cause are per se unreasonable).
3. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354–55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
4. See Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970, no writ) (holding
that no government search had occurred because the school administrator was acting in loco
parentis; because the parent does not exercise governmental power, neither does the principal
acting in the place of the parent).
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Blackstone explained in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, a
parent
may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his
charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to
answer the purposes for which he is employed.5

In 1985, the Supreme Court, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,6 held that
the actions of public school teachers and administrators are governed
by the Fourth Amendment. At issue in T.L.O. was a high school administrator’s search of a student’s purse to obtain evidence confirming a teacher’s direct observation that a girl was smoking in a lavatory in violation of school rules.7 The T.L.O. Court found the
traditional interpretation of in loco parentis to be “in tension with
contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.”8 Specifically,
the Court held that the concept of in loco parentis is not entirely
“‘consonant with compulsory education laws’”9 and is inconsistent
with other Supreme Court decisions treating school officials as state
actors for purposes of the Due Process and Free Speech Clauses of
the Constitution.10 Further, the Court had previously held that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the school house
gate.”11 Based upon these considerations, the Court held that public
school teachers and administrators are subject to the limits of the
Fourth Amendment and “cannot claim the parents’ immunity from
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”12

5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453.
6. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
7. See id. at 328.
8. Id. at 336.
9. Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)).
10. See id.
11. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(referring to First Amendment rights of “freedom of speech or expression”).
12. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). In explaining its holding, the
Court wrote:
We have held school officials subject to the commands of the First Amendment . . .
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If school authorities are
state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression
and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather that public authority when conducting searches of their students. More generally, the Court has recognized that ‘the concept of parental dele-
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Even so, the Supreme Court upheld the search at issue because,
although school teachers and administrators are subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the unique circumstances
and setting of a school require a diminution of Fourth Amendment
requirements. The Court explained that “the preservation of order
and a proper educational environment . . . in the schools requires a
certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,” which
entails “some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject.”13 Therefore, the Court held that
neither the warrant requirement14 nor the probable cause requirement15 apply to a search of a public school student by a school
teacher or administrator. “Rather,” the Supreme Court wrote, “the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”16 The Supreme
Court concluded that a search of a public school student by a teacher
or administrator would be constitutionally permissible “when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up

gation’ as a source of school authority is not entirely ‘consonant with compulsory
education laws.’ Igrahm v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 1407, 51
L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Today’s public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. . . . In carrying out
searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials
act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they
cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 339-40.
14. See id. at 340. The Court explained:
The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. . . .
[W]e hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a
student who is under their authority.
Id.
15. See id. at 341. The Court stated:
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial
need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools
does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on
probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating
the law.
Id.
16. Id. at 341.
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evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school.”17
The Supreme Court recently expanded upon T.L.O. in Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton (“Vernonia”).18 In Vernonia, the Court
upheld a suspicionless search program for public school students who
wished to participate in interscholastic athletics.19 This decision has
been criticized as being too quick to abandon a suspicion-based drug
testing search regime, thereby depriving students of their only remaining Fourth Amendment protection—the New Jersey v. T.L.O.
individualized suspicion requirement.20
Since Vernonia, several school districts have moved to implement
suspicionless drug testing programs for various groups of students. 21
Several of these programs have been challenged, with the courts divided on whether suspicionless mandatory drug testing violates students’ Fourth Amendment rights. This Note examines Todd v. Rush
County Schools,22 a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that relied upon Vernonia to uphold a warrantless, suspicionless urinalysis
testing program for public school students who wish to participate in
extracurricular activities. Part II discusses Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton.23 Part III presents the facts of Todd v. Rush County
Schools and reviews the reasoning behind the decision. Part IV addresses several problems with the application of Vernonia to Todd.
That Part also discusses the suspicion-based standard and its ability
to fulfill the purposes of a suspicionless program while protecting
students’ privacy interests in a public school context. Part V concludes that the Vernonia holding should be limited to its facts and
that a suspicion-based standard would best preserve students’ constitutional rights while protecting the government’s ability to maintain
order and a proper educational environment in public schools.
17. Id. at 342.
18. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
19. See id. at 665.
20. See id. at 680-81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
342 (1985); Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of
a Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2571-75 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 985 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc
denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998); Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).
22. 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 824 (1998).
23. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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II. VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON 24

In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a drug testing program
that called for random urinalysis drug testing of students who wished
to participate in interscholastic athletic programs. In doing so, the
Court balanced students’ privacy interests against the government
interest of maintaining order and a proper educational environment
in public schools by deterring drug use among the nation’s school
children. Initially, the Court explained the problems in the school
district:
[A] large segment of the student body, particularly those involved
in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary
actions had reached “epidemic proportions.” The coincidence of an
almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary
reports along with the staff’s direct observations of students using
drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration
to the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by
alcohol and drug abuse as well as the student’s [sic] misperceptions
about the drug culture.25

The Court noted that “[n]ot only were athletes included among the
drug users but, as the District Court found, athletes were the leaders
of the drug culture.”26
In its analysis, the Court first considered the privacy interest of
public school students. It stated that “[c]entral, in our view, to the
present case is the fact that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children,
who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody of the State
as schoolmaster.”27 Although the Court, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., held
that school officials “cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment,”28 school officials possess a
“custodial and tutelary” power that “permit[s] a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”29 Further, because public school students must submit to various physical
exams and vaccinations, “students within the school environment
24. Id.
25. Id. at 649 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D.
Or. 1992)).
26. Id. (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 654.
28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
29. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
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have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population
generally.”30 Concerning students who participate in interscholastic
athletics, the Supreme Court found persuasive the fact that studentathletes, because of the nature of athletics, have a lesser expectation
of privacy than the general student body.31 Additionally, studentathletes voluntarily choose to participate in interscholastic athletics,
thereby subjecting themselves to a high degree of regulation.32
The Vernonia Court continued by considering the governmental
interest in preservation of order and a proper educational environment in public schools by deterring drug use among public school
students. This interest did not need to meet some “fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern,” the Court reasoned, but merely
had to be “important enough to justify the particular search at
hand.”33 The Court found that the government interest in the educational environment of public schools was important enough to justify the search at issue in Vernonia, because “the effects of a druginfested school are visited not just upon the users but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted.”34 Further, the Court explained that with student athletes in
particular there was a need to respond to “the risk of immediate
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his
sport.”35 The Supreme Court found that the program was an efficient means to achieve the governmental interest because it both deterred drug use among athletes and worked against the wide-ranging

30. Id. at 657 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348) (Powell, J., concurring)).
31. See id. at 657. The Court explained:
School sports are not for the bashful. They require “suiting up” before each practice
or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the
usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy they afford. The locker
rooms in Vernonia are typical: No individual dressing rooms are provided; shower
heads are lined up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition or curtain; not
even all the toilet stalls have doors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has noted, there is “an element of ‘communal undress’ inherent in
athletic participation.”
Id. (quoting Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanou County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
32. See id. (“[S]tudents who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to
expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.” (citations omitted)).
33. Id. at 661.
34. Id. at 662.
35. Id.
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drug problem in the district.36 The Court concluded that because of
the greatly decreased expectation of privacy among student-athletes
and the overwhelming government interest in deterring drug use
among the nation’s school children the testing program was constitutional.
III. TODD V. RUSH COUNTY SCHOOLS
A. Facts
In August 1996, the Rush County, Indiana, School Board approved a random, suspicionless drug testing program. In order to
participate in any extracurricular activity or drive to and from school,
the student and a parent or guardian had to consent to the student
being tested for drugs, alcohol, or tobacco in random, unannounced
urinalysis examinations.37 Extracurricular activities included “athletic
teams, Student Council, Foreign Language Clubs, Fellowship of
Christian Athletes, Future Farmers of America Officers, and the Library Club.”38 Following the implementation of the program, the
parents of four students refused to sign the consent form, thereby
barring the students from participating in extracurricular activities.39
These parents brought suit claiming that the program violated the
students’ Fourth Amendment rights. On cross motions for summary
judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the court granted the school district’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the students’ motion.40 The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the grant of summary judgment for
the district and ruled that random drug testing of students participating in extracurricular activities did not violate the Fourth Amendment.41 The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari.42
36. See id. at 663.
37. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied,
139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998).
38. Id.
39. Prior to refusing to participate in the drug testing program, the plaintiff students
had participated in extracurricular activities through membership in the Library Club, Future
Farmers of America, and videotaping the football team. See id.
40. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 801 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824
(1998).
41. Todd, 133 F.3d at 984.
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B. Reasoning
Relying on Vernonia, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that students who participate in extracurricular activities have a decreased expectation of privacy. The court based this conclusion on
the finding that “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere”43 and emphasized that “the testing policy
was undertaken in furtherance of the school district’s ‘responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care.’”44 Most important, the court emphasized the
fact that “[students] are required to submit to random drug testing
only as a condition of participation in an extracurricular activity”45 in
which they have voluntarily chosen to participate. Although the
court recognized that extracurricular activities “‘are considered valuable to the school experience, and [that] participation may assist a
student in getting into college,’” it noted that “extracurricular activities, like athletics, ‘are a privilege at the High School.’”46
The district court relied heavily upon the governmental interest
of “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren”47 to find
that the program at issue in Todd did not violate students’ Fourth
Amendment Rights. The court of appeals agreed.
The plague of illicit drug use which currently threatens our nation’s
schools adds a major dimension to the difficulties the schools face
in fulfilling their purpose—the education of our children. If the
schools are to survive and prosper, school administrators must have
reasonable means at their disposal to deter conduct which substantially disrupts the school environment.48

Because the “school years are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe,”49 the school
42. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 525 U.S. 824 (1998).
43. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
656 (1995)).
44. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
45. Id. (quoting Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanou County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309,
1319 (7th Cir. 1988)).
46. Id. (quoting Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1997)).
47. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824
(1998) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661).
48. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324).
49. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661).
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district had an interest in deterring student drug use through a drug
testing program. The court also felt that extending the Vernonia
framework to include extracurricular activities was justified because
the “linchpin”50 of the program was to protect the health of students, and the program was “sufficiently similar”51 to the program
upheld in Vernonia.
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Seventh Circuit held in Todd that the outcome of
the case was governed by Vernonia, the court did not adhere to the
Supreme Court’s reasoning and was too quick to deprive students of
their only remaining Fourth Amendment protection: the New Jersey
v. T.L.O. individual suspicion requirement.52 Part A discusses the
court’s misapplication of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton to the
circumstances present in Todd v. Rush County Schools. Part B suggests that a reasonable suspicion requirement for searches of public
school students preserves students’ remaining constitutional rights
while still allowing school teachers and administrators the latitude
needed to maintain order and a proper educational environment in
public schools.
A. Suspicionless Testing Programs Directed at Students Participating
in Extracurricular Activities
The Todd court ignored the Supreme Court’s emphasis on student-athletes’ greatly decreased expectation of privacy and placed too
much emphasis on what it perceived to be the voluntary nature of
extracurricular activities. Further, the extreme circumstances that justified the suspicionless search program in Vernonia were not present
in Todd.
1. Unwarranted and unjustified expansion of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton to include students not participating in athletics
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court found it dispositive that the
students targeted by the testing program (1) had an expectation of
privacy of an even lesser degree than nonathlete students and (2)
50. Id. at 986.
51. Id. at 987.
52. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
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voluntarily chose to participate in interscholastic athletics. In addition to the element of “communal undress” present in athletic locker
rooms, athletes at Vernonia’s public schools were required to submit
to a preseason physical exam (which included producing a urine
sample), acquire adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance
waiver, maintain a grade point average above a minimum level, and
comply with rules of training, conduct, and dress. The Vernonia
court concluded that “students who voluntarily participate in school
athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and
privileges, including privacy.”53 Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized the substantial psychological and physical risks posed to athletes by drug use: “[I]t must not be lost sight of that this program is
directed more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk
of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he
is playing his sport is particularly high.”54
Although the testing program at issue in Todd sought to include
student participants in all extracurricular activities, not just interscholastic athletics, the court of appeals found that “the reasoning compelling drug testing of athletes also applies to testing of students involved in extracurricular activities. Certainly successful extracurricular
activities require healthy students.”55 It upheld the trial court’s conclusion that, despite the increased privacy intrusions and regulations
inflicted upon participants in athletics, “any perceived differences between the student athletes in Vernonia and the nonathlete extracurricular participants in this case turn out to be more ethereal than
real.”56
This reasoning ignores the fact that athletes are subjected, as
noted in Vernonia, to even greater intrusions of privacy than the
general student body or participants in nonathletic extracurricular ac-

53. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 662. The Supreme Court noted that drugs have both psychological and physical effects on athletes. Included among the psychological effects are impairment of judgment,
slow reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain. The physical effects include an
artificially induced heart rate increase, peripheral vasoconstriction, blood pressure increase,
masking of the normal fatigue response, irregular blood pressure responses, a reduction in the
oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood, and possible coronary artery spasms and myocardial infarction. See id.
55. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
56. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824
(1998) (emphasis added).
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tivities. Certainly there is no remarkable element of communal undress present for participants in the Library Club or Future Farmers
of America. The court of appeals comes distressingly close to authorizing blanket, random, suspicionless searches of all public school students based upon the lesser expectation of privacy held by students
in general.57 In Vernonia, the Supreme Court cautiously avoided this
result by emphasizing the lesser privacy expectation of student athletes as opposed to the general student body.58
It is difficult to reconcile the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Todd
with a statement from Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp. (“Schaill”),59 a Seventh Circuit decision, relied upon as
controlling authority by the Todd court. In Schaill, the Seventh Circuit upheld a random, suspicionless drug testing program for participants in athletics based on athletes’ decreased expectation of privacy.60 The court stated that “we believe that sports are quite
distinguishable from almost any other activity. Random testing of
athletes does not necessarily imply random testing of band members
or the chess team.”61
Additionally, the district court in Rush, attempted to analogize
the Vernonia to the Rush County testing program by emphasizing
the perceived voluntary nature of extracurricular activities.
“[E]xtracurricular activities, like sports, are voluntary activities which
submit the students to extra rules and regulations. Participation in
extracurricular programs is voluntary and a privilege; any student
joining these activities is subject to regulation beyond that of a nonparticipant.”62 Although the district court spoke generally of “extra
rules and regulations” attendant to extracurricular activities, it did
57. Notably, the Eighth Circuit, in Miller ex rel. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th
Cir. 1999), recently upheld the constitutionality of a school district’s random urinalysis testing
program for all students in grades seven through twelve, based upon the lesser expectation of
privacy held by public school students. See id. at 578-79. The decision was later vacated as
moot because the plaintiff-student was no longer a student in the school district. See id. at 582.
58. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (“By choosing to ‘go out for the team,’ [student athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed
on students generally.”); see also 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §10.11(b) at
821 (3d ed. 1996).
59. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
60. See id. at 1310.
61. Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted).
62. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 806 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824
(1998).
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not specify any particular rules or regulations enforced upon students
participating in nonathletic extracurricular activities such as the Library Club, Future Farmers of America.
Further, the district court ignored the very likely situation of a
student, as part of a graded class, being required to participate in an
extracurricular activity.63 In addition, invaluable experience is gained
through extracurricular activities, and college and university admission committees place strong emphasis on extracurricular activities.64
Although this situation is not identical to that in which students are
required to participate in an extracurricular activity as part of a
graded class, “the reality for many students who wish to pursue postsecondary educational training and/or professional vocations requiring experience garnered only by participating in extracurricular activities is that they must engage in such activities.”65
Finally, unlike the substantial and documented health risks posed
by drug use to students participating in athletics, the court did not
pinpoint an increased risk to students who use drugs and participate
in the Library Club, band, or any of Rush County’s other nonathletic extracurricular activities.66 The court merely reasoned that
“successful extracurricular activities require healthy students.”67 This
is not a sufficient ground on which to deny nonathlete public school
students what is, in essence, their only remaining Fourth Amendment protection—the individualized suspicion requirement.68 Thus,
where students who do not participate in athletics are the targets of
the searches, the necessary decreased expectation of privacy that student-athletes possess is not present to tip the scales in favor of allowing suspicionless, mandatory drug testing. In those situations, a

63. See, e.g., Trinidad Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1110 (Colo. 1998) (en banc)
(holding unconstitutional a school drug policy requiring consent to random drug tests in order
to participate in extracurricular activities; student was required, as part of his for-credit instrumental music class, to participate in band, an extracurricular activity.).
64. See, e.g., Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc
denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998).
65. Trinidad Sch. Dist., 963 P.2d at 1109 (emphasis added); see also Todd, 139 F.3d at
573 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“Exclusion of a high school student from all extracurricular activities deprives that student of a great deal of what the modern American high school has to offer
in terms of academic and personal development.”).
66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
67. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
68. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
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suspicion-based standard should be used in order to allow students
to retain their remaining Fourth Amendment protection.
2. The absence of extreme circumstances similar to those present in
Vernonia
In its holding, the Supreme Court emphasized the unique and
extreme circumstances present in the Vernonia schools.
[A] large segment of the student body, particularly those involved
in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary
problems had reached “epidemic proportions.” The coincidence of
an almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary reports along with the staff’s direct observations of students
using drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being
fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as the student’s [sic] misperceptions about the drug culture.69

The Court noted that “[n]ot only were athletes included among
the drug users but, as the District Court found, athletes were the
leaders of the drug culture.”70 Further, the Supreme Court upheld
the testing regime largely because the program targeted the leaders
of the drug culture at the schools.71
In stark contrast to the circumstances in Vernonia, the district
court in Todd found that “[t]he empirical evidence is not particularly
indicative of drug, alcohol or tobacco use by a majority (or even a
large minority) of the students,” and “[t]here also is very little to indicate that students in extracurricular activities are ‘ringleaders’ of a
drug rebellion, as in Vernonia.”72 Therefore, unlike Vernonia, the
program in Todd did not work to eliminate a drug problem by targeting the leaders of the “drug culture.” In short, there was nothing
in Todd that would justify a suspicionless search program in the face
of minimal evidence of a drug problem among the targets of those
searches.

69. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995) (quoting Acton v.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 786 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 663.
72. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 805 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824
(1998).
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B. The Superiority of an Individualized Suspicion Standard Where the
Unique Circumstances of Vernonia are not Present
Vernonia must not be interpreted as condoning anything but
suspicionless searches of student-athletes who are known to be the
leaders of a well-documented and extreme drug problem among the
student body. When the unique circumstances of Vernonia are not
present, an individualized suspicion standard, based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O., should be followed.
In T.L.O., the Court held that a search of a public school student by
a school official will be constitutionally permissible “when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school.”73
1. A suspicion-based regime would be very effective in public schools
As the Supreme Court has explained, the strong preference for
an individualized suspicion requirement will only be disregarded
when it is impractical or not feasible under the particular circumstances.74 Therefore, if an individualized suspicion requirement
would be effective under the circumstances presented, the requirement should not be forsaken.75 The Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to this tenet, only upholding suspicionless regimes where an
individualized suspicion standard is clearly found to be ineffective
and unworkable.76
73. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (footnote omitted).
74. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989)
(holding that because it is “not feasible to subject [customs] employees and their work product
to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments,” a
suspicion requirement is impractical for searches of customs officials for drug impairment); Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 n.40 (1979) (holding that because observation needed to gain
suspicion would cause “obvious disruption of the confidentiality and intimacy that these visits
are intended to afford,” a suspicion requirement for searches of prisoners for smuggling following contact visits is impracticable); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557
(1976) (“[A] requirement that stops on major inland routes always . . . based on reasonable
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the
particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of
illegal aliens”); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J.) (observing that because of the “conceded inapplicability” of the profile method of detecting hijackers and the great number of plane travelers, suspicion-based searches of airport passengers’
carry-on luggage is impractical); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (holding
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There is no reason for courts to depart from this well-established
tenet because it is far from clear that an individual suspicion standard
is ineffective and unworkable in the public school setting. Public
school students are under constant supervision, scrutiny, and observation in hallways, parking lots, lunchrooms, classrooms, and locker
rooms by administrators, teachers, coaches, and fellow students.77
Teachers, administrators, and coaches in a public school context are
in a position to observe and detect behavior sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion of conduct that is either criminal or in contravention of school rules.78 Further, students often supply specific information about the activities of other students.79 Therefore, it appears that an individualized suspicion requirement would be very
effective in the public school context.
In contrast, the court of appeals in Todd v. Rush County Schools
does not explain why a suspicion based regime would be impractical
or compromise significant governmental and public concerns. The
district court merely explains that Rush County Schools’ motivation
for implementing the suspicionless program was subjective observations by a coach and an administrator that led them to believe that

that “faulty wiring” and other safety code violations are not visible from outside the house,
making suspicion requirement for searches of homes for code violations impracticable).
77. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (“[A] proper educational environment requires close
supervision of schoolchildren.”).
[Public school students] spend the school hours in close association with each other,
both in the classroom and during recreational periods. The students in a particular
class often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have
a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled
except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child.
Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 678 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“In
most schools, the entire pool of potential search targets—students—is under constant supervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker
rooms.” (citations omitted)).
78. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
79. See In re C., 26 Cal. App.3d 320, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (reporting of student
keeping drugs in locker); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 1195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (reporting that student had taken some pills and appeared to be intoxicated); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (Mass. 1992) (reporting of student attempting to sell drugs);
Berry v. State, 561 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. App. 1990) (reporting by students that another student
was selling drugs); Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d 1199, 1200 (Mass. 1990) (reporting
by students that another student had a gun); People v. Stewart, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254-55
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (reporting of student keeping drugs on person).
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drug use was growing among the students of Rush County.80 In its
short opinion, the court of appeals overlooked the fact that these
subjective observations noted by the district court would most likely
have given rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug use, thus
justifying a search under a suspicion-based standard, while preserving
students’ remaining constitutional rights.
2. A suspicion-based regime can satisfy the government interest in
deterring student drug use while better protecting students’ Fourth
Amendment rights
Although the Supreme Court is often very quick to proclaim that
students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”81 an unjustified suspicionless search regime has just that
effect. It strips students of their only remaining Fourth Amendment
protection—the individualized suspicion requirement.82 It is intuitive
that, much like suspicion-based law enforcement, a public school
suspicion-based regime would not be as effective as a mass, suspicionless testing regime.83 But the price paid for the liberties enjoyed
under the Fourth Amendment is sometimes high. As the Supreme
Court noted in Arizona v. Hicks, a decision that found a search lacking probable cause to be unreasonable, “there is nothing new in the
realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality
of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”84 While a small few
may slip through the cracks, the great majority of offenders will be
caught under a suspicion-based search standard.85 A survey of the
major Fourth Amendment cases concerning public schools demonstrates that the evidence obtained through teacher and administrator
observations of students is sufficient to warrant drug related searches
under a suspicion-based standard.86 This would achieve the govern80. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 983 F. Supp. 799, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d, 133
F.3d 984 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824
(1998).
81. Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
82. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
83. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 680 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
84. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987).
85. See 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, at § 10.11(b) at 812 (“[I]n most instances the evidence of wrongdoing prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable cause test.”).
86. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 679 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that a teacher observed small groups of students passing joints back and forth across the street at a restaurant
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ment purposes of deterring student drug use and reducing the effects
of drugs on the educational environment while at the same time ensuring that public school students are not subject to unreasonable
searches and seizures.87
V. CONCLUSION
Public school students, while within the “school house gate,” do
not enjoy two of the Fourth Amendment’s traditional categorical
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures: the warrant
requirement and the probable cause requirement. Recently, courts
have moved to deprive students of their only remaining Fourth
Amendment protection—the New Jersey v. T.L.O. individualized suspicion requirement.88
The holding of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, upholding
a suspicionless testing program for students participating in interscholastic athletics, should be limited to its unique circumstances and
not used to support suspicionless regimes for other groups of students or the general student body. For situations not akin to Vernonia, an individualized suspicion requirement for searches of students
by teachers and administrators should be followed. Accordingly, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals erred in Todd by allowing random,
suspicionless drug testing of students who participate in any extracurricular activity. An individualized suspicion-based standard can
achieve the government interests in deterring student drug use and
avoiding the effects of drugs on the educational environment while
preserving students’ remaining Fourth Amendment protection.
J. Nathan Jensen

before school and during school hours; a group of students was caught skipping school and
using drugs at one of the students’ houses; several students admitted drug use to school officials (some of them being caught with marijuana pipes); a clearly inebriated student presented
himself to his teacher and had to be sent home; a student, who was observed dancing and singing at the top of his voice in the back of the classroom, was asked by a teacher what was going
on and replied, “Well, I’m just high on life”; during a school road trip, the wrestling coach
smelled marijuana smoke in a hotel room occupied by four wrestlers); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328
(noting that a teacher directly observed students smoking in lavatory); Todd, 983 F. Supp. at
803 (noting that teachers’ and administrators’ “subjective perception[s]” led them to believe
there was a growing drug problem in the school district).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
88. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
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